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Abstract
The Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (DAA) is the most widely accepted and
used algorithm to match students, workers, or residents to colleges, firms or
hospitals respectively. In this paper, we consider for the first time, the complex-
ity of manipulating DAA by agents such as colleges that have capacity more
than one. For such agents, truncation is not an exhaustive strategy. We present
efficient algorithms to compute a manipulation for the colleges when the colleges
are proposing or being proposed to. We then conduct detailed experiments on
the frequency of manipulable instances in order to get better insight into strate-
gic aspects of two-sided matching markets. Our results bear somewhat negative
news: assuming that agents have information other agents’ preference, they not
only often have an incentive to misreport but there exist efficient algorithms to
find such a misreport.
Keywords: Two-sided matching, Computational Complexity, and
Manipulation
JEL: C62, C63, and C78
1. Introduction
Deciding which students get admitted to which college, which workers get
jobs at which firm, matching medical students to hospitals for their intern-
ship or residency – all these are examples of two-sided matching markets. In
these markets, agents from two disjoint sets are paired with each other using
Email addresses: haris.aziz@nicta.com.au (Haris Aziz), seedig@in.tum.de (Hans
Georg Seedig), wedel@ma.tum.de (Jana Karina von Wedel)
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a matching mechanism that takes into account their reported preferences and
capacities. The study of such matching market mechanisms is an important
field in microeconomics. Alvin Roth and Lloyd Shapley were awarded the No-
bel memorial prize in economic science “for the theory of stable allocations and
the practice of market design”. Within market design, the deferred acceptance
algorithm (DAA)—sometimes referred to as the Gale-Shapley algorithm [6]—is
one of the most widely used centralized matching market mechanism. The main
focus of this paper is on DAA applied on the college admission market in which
students are matched to colleges.
One of the main reasons for the popularity of DAA for real-world matching
markets, is that it always yields a stable matching. A matching is stable if
no agent is assigned a partner that is unacceptable to him or her and no two
agents, that are not matched with each other, prefer each other to (one of) their
respective matching partners.
However, a well-known drawback of DAA is that it is not strategyproof, i.e.,
there exist instances for which an agent has an incentive to misreport his pref-
erences. This does not stem from a design flaw of DAA but from the fact that
no stable matching algorithm is strategyproof [see 16, p. 622f]. Two redeem-
ing factors regarding this manipulability could be (i) that finding a beneficial
manipulation strategy for a given agent, if one exists, could be computation-
ally intractable or (ii) that only an insignificantly small fraction of instances of
matching markets can be beneficially manipulated. The following two research
questions naturally arise: Is the problem of finding a beneficial manipulation for
a given agent computationally feasible? Is a significant fraction of instances of
matching markets beneficially manipulable?
For manipulations by agents that can only be matched to a single other
agent, these questions have already been partially answered in the work by
Immorlica and Mahdian [7], Kojima and Pathak [12] and Teo et al. [22]. The
goal of this paper is to examine strategic issues for agents that may have capacity
more than one, e.g., colleges in college admission markets. These strategic issues
can have profound effects on the assessment of stable matching procedures since
the strong normative properties of DAA such as stability only hold as long as
agents report their truthful preferences. If agents are frequently in a position
to beneficially misreport their preferences and if finding such a misreport is
computationally feasible, then the normative properties of DAA outcomes may
be compromised.
We show that the problem of finding a beneficial manipulation for a given
college is computationally feasible for both variants assuming they have knowl-
edge of the preferences of all students and colleges. In particular, we prove that
under college-proposing DAA, for a given college, a beneficial manipulation or
the fact that no such manipulation exists can be determined in polynomial
time. The same problem under student-proposing DAA is shown to be fixed-
parameter tractable w.r.t. the capacity of the college. Based on experimental
results obtained by simulating college-proposing and student-proposing DAA,
we further conclude that a significant fraction of instances of matching markets
can be beneficially manipulated by at least one college.
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2. Related Work
Roth [16] showed that there exists no stable and strategyproof matching
mechanism for two-sided matching markets. This impossibility theorem in-
spired several avenues of research relevant to this paper. Some researchers tried
to determine the relevance of this result for real-world applications of DAA by
investigating which fraction of instances of matching markets is in fact bene-
ficially manipulable [7, 12, 18, 22]. We complement this existing work by con-
sidering manipulation by colleges via misrepresenting preferences in markets of
the college admission type in which agents are required to submit complete pref-
erence lists. Regarding simulations, we use Mallows mixture models instead of
uniform distributions to generate preferences whose structure is arguably more
realistic.
An orthogonal direction of research is that of identifying domains for which
a stable and strategyproof mechanism does exist. This can be done by placing
restrictions on the admissible preferences [2, 1, 11, 9]. DAA has been shown to
be strategyproof for the proposing-side if all proposing agents have capacity one
[3, 19]. Proposees in general can however potentially manipulate the outcome of
DAA and the same holds for proposing agents with capacity greater than one,
e.g., colleges in college admission markets.
There has also been work on algorithms to compute optimal preference re-
ports. Teo et al. [22] consider manipulation by an individual women w in one-
to-one markets when all other agents state their preferences truthfully and show
that a beneficial manipulation by w, if one exists, can be found in polynomial
time both in the case in which women can truncate their preference list as well
as in the case in which they need to submit complete preference lists.
The computational complexity problem of computing a manipulation has al-
ready been studied in great depth for voting rules [see e.g., 5, 4]. For one-to-one
matching markets, Kobayashi and Matsui [10] and Sukegawa and Yamamoto
[21] considered the complexity of computing beneficial manipulation for groups
of agents. In general agents may be allowed to express some lesser preferred
agents as unacceptable. Stability of matching requires that no agent is matched
to an unacceptable agent. An agent can implicitly express some agent j as un-
acceptable by not including j in its preference list. In view of this allowance, an
agent may misreport his preference by blacklisting/dropping an agent but not
blacklisting a lesser preferred agent or by truncating his preference list by not in-
cluding some least preferred acceptable agents in the list. Jaramillo et al. [8] have
recently shown that truncation of true preferences is an exhaustive manipulation
strategy for agents with capacity one. This result implies that the problem of
finding a beneficial manipulation for a given student s under college-proposing
DAA is solvable in polynomial time by checking each truncated preference list.
In many real-world matching markets agents are required to submit complete
preference lists, which prevents manipulation via blacklisting or truncation [22].
This is a reasonable assumption as seen in the context of college admissions: as
long as all the applying student satisfy some minimum requirements, they can-
not be deemed unacceptable by any college. Colleges may want each slot should
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be filled, preferably by good students, but by any student if necessary. If agents
are not allowed to express truncated preference lists, it effectively means that
agents are not allowed to express any agent as unacceptable. Agents may still
manipulate in these markets by submitting preference lists that are complete
but do not reflect their true preferences. We call manipulation via submitting
such a falsified preference list misrepresenting preferences. Even if agents are
aware of the preferences of the other agents, misrepresenting preferences at least
guarantees the agent a match whereas dropping or truncation strategies by the
agent may leave the agent empty-handed in uncertain scenarios. In many-to-
one and many-to-many markets the outcome of a stable matching procedure
does not only depend on the submitted preferences, but also on the reported
capacities. It was first shown by So¨nmez [20] that underreporting capacities, i.e.
claiming a capacity q′ < q where q is the capacity of a college, can lead to a
beneficial manipulation. When indifferences in students preferences are allowed,
colleges can also benefit from overreporting capacities, i.e. claiming a capacity
q′ > q where q is the capacity of a college.
While previous work is focussed on manipulation by agents with capacity
one, we investigate the computational complexity of finding a beneficial manip-
ulation for a given college in college admission markets.
3. Model
Two-sided matching markets contain two disjoint sets of agents A and B.
Every agent i has preferences >i over the agents on the other side of the market.
If a >i a
′ then agent i prefers being matched with a over being matched with
a′. We call the set >= (>i)i∈A∪B consisting of the preference relations of all
agents a preference profile. Throughout this paper we assume all agents to have
strict, complete, and transitive preferences unless indicated otherwise. The goal
in these markets is to find a mapping µ from agents of one set to agents of the
other set, called a matching, with a ∈ µ(b)⇔ b ∈ µ(a).
Famous examples of two-sided matching markets are the marriage problem
and the college admission problem as first introduced by Gale and Shapley
[6]. In the marriage problem each man/woman is matched with at most one
woman/man. In such a case, we speak of a one-to-one matching market. In a
market (C, S, q,>) of the college admission type, which we focus on in this paper,
we have a set C of colleges and a set S of students. Generic representatives of
these groups are denoted by c and s, respectively. Every student may only be
matched to one college whereas every college c is equipped with a capacity (or
quota) value q(c) ≥ 1 denoting the number of students it may be matched with.
Such a market is referred to as a many-to-one matching market. There also
exist markets for many-to-many matching, e.g., for matching firms and workers,
each of which may work for several firms. However, these markets will not be
considered in detail in this paper.
When dealing with many-to-one (or many-to-many) matching markets, we
need to extend the preference relation >c of a college c to preferences over sets
of students in a meaningful way. To this end, we assume responsive preferences
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throughout this paper: for all S′ ⊂ S with |S′| < q(c) and s, s′ ∈ S \ S′ it holds
that
S′ ∪ {s} >cS
′ ∪ {s′} if and only if s >c s
′ and
S′ ∪ {s} >cS
′.
Note that a college c only prefers adding an additional student to its set of
matches over not doing so if its capacity q(c) is not yet filled. Any matching
that assigns more than q(c) students to a college c is not valid. Thus each
agent expresses preferences over sets of agents by only expressing preferences
over agents. When there is incomparability between two sets of allocations with
respect to responsiveness, we will assume that the agent is indifferent between
them. Alternatively, even if an agent is not indifferent among such sets, when we
consider beneficial manipulations, we will only consider those in which the result
of manipulation dominates the original allocation with respect to the responsive
relation. For example, if the preferences are a > b > c > d and if {b, c} is the
match, then {a, d} cannot be the outcome of a beneficial manipulation since
{a, d} is not better outcome than {b, c} with respect to the responsive relation.
4. Deferred Acceptance
Algorithms
The deferred acceptance algorithm (DAA) was first officially introduced in
1962 by Gale and Shapley.1 Today, DAA is applied on numerous real world
problems (see e.g., http://www.matching-in-practice.eu).
An execution of DAA consists of several rounds. In each round, agents
from one side of the market, the proposers, propose to agents of the other side,
the proposees, to be matched with them. Proposees can tentatively accept a
proposal, but may revoke their acceptance should they in a later round receive a
proposal from an agent they prefer to their tentative match. Their final decisions
regarding their matching partners are therefore deferred until the final round.
Depending on whether students or colleges are considered the “proposing”
side during the algorithm, there are two variants of DAA for the college admis-
sion market, i.e., student-proposing and college-proposing DAA.
Student-proposing DAA.
(i) Each student applies to his favorite college.
(ii) Each college rejects all applications from students that are unacceptable
to it. If a college received at most q applications from acceptable students
so far, all those students are put on the colleges waiting list. Otherwise
1Roth reported later that DAA has already been in use by the National Resident Matching
Program (NRMP) since 1951 for matching medical students to hospitals for their medical
internship or residency in the United States. There, DAA naturally evolved through a trial
and error process that is described in [17].
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the college puts its favorite q students among all applicants on the waiting
list and rejects all remaining ones.
(iii) Each student that was rejected in the previous step applies to his favorite
among the colleges he or she has not yet applied to.
(iv) Steps 2 and 3 are repeated until it holds for all students that they were
either not rejected in the previous step or already applied to all colleges
acceptable to them.
(v) Each college admits all students on its waiting list.
By the use of the waiting list, all final admissions are deferred to the end of
the procedure. The algorithm can easily be adapted to colleges making offers
to students.
College-proposing DAA.
(i) Each college makes offers to its q favorite students.
(ii) Each student keeps the offer of his or her favorite acceptable college among
those that made an offer to him/her so far (if such a college exists) and
rejects all others.
(iii) Each college that was rejected in the previous step makes offers to its k
favorite among the students it has not yet made offers to, where k is the
number of students that rejected that college in the previous step. If there
are less than k students left that the college did not yet make offers to, it
makes offers to all those students.
(iv) Steps 2 and 3 are repeated until it holds for all colleges that they were ei-
ther not rejected in the previous step or already made offers to all students
acceptable to them.
(v) Each student gets admitted by the college whose offer he kept.
A result regarding DAA in general that is frequently used when arguing
about manipulation is that, if preferences are strict, the order in which proposers
are considered, i.e., make their proposals, does not affect the outcome of DAA
[14]. This means that given strict preferences, each variant of DAA has a unique
outcome.
In many real-world matching markets agents are required to submit com-
plete preference lists, which prevents manipulation via blacklisting or trunca-
tion. This effectively means that agents are not allowed to express any agent
as unacceptable. Agents may still manipulate in these markets by submitting
preference lists that are complete but do not reflect their true preferences. We
call manipulation via submitting such a falsified preference list misrepresent-
ing preferences. Even if agents are aware of the preferences of the other agents,
misrepresenting preferences at least guarantees the agent a match whereas drop-
ping or truncation strategies by the agent may leave the agent empty-handed
in uncertain scenarios.
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5. Manipulation of student-proposing DAA
We show that it can be checked in polynomial time whether a given college
c ∈ C can misrepresent its preferences and obtain a better outcome. Let S,C
be the agents of a many-to-one matching market and µ denote the matching
that is obtained by applying student-proposing DAA to this market. First it
is shown in that whenever the market admits a beneficial manipulation µ′ by
a college c ∈ C, then there also exists a beneficial manipulation µ′′ by c s.t.
|µ(c)\µ′′(c)| = 1. We then use this fact to reduce the problem to that of finding
a beneficial manipulation via misrepresentation for a given proposee in a one-
to-one matching market, which was shown by Teo et al. [22] to be solvable
in polynomial time. We describe some key concepts that we will use for our
algorithmic result.
New Proposals. In order for a college c to potentially benefit from a manipula-
tion, it must during the manipulated execution of DAA receive proposals from
students that do not propose to it during the execution of DAA under truthful
preferences and that it prefers to some of its matches under µ. Since all agents
but c are assumed to state their preferences truthfully, any such new proposals
must somehow be caused by c misrepresenting its preferences. We formally de-
fine a new proposal as follows: Let s ∈ S, c ∈ C and µ′ be a manipulation s.t. s
proposes to c during the manipulated execution of DAA leading to µ′. We call
the proposal from s to c a new proposal if s does not propose to c during the
execution of DAA under truthful preferences.
Rejection in favor. The only way a misrepresentation of preferences by c can
cause new proposals, is if it leads to c rejecting some student(s) t it does not
reject during the truthful run of DAA. Since the only students that c receives
proposals from during the truthful run of DAA and does not reject are those it
is matched with, we obtain t ∈ µ(c). Therefore, after being rejected by c, t will
make one or more new proposals to colleges c′ s.t. c >t c
′, if such colleges exist.
If t is accepted by some such c′, this college might reject another student s′
in favor of t. Formally, let s′, t ∈ S and c′ ∈ C. We say that c′ rejects s′ in
favor of t if both s′ and t propose to c′ during the execution of student-proposing
DAA and one of the following holds:
(i) At the time at which t proposes to c′, c′ has q(c′) temporary matches.
Student s′ is the least preferred, according to >c′ , among those temporary
matches and t >c′ s
′. Therefore c′ rejects s′ in order to be able to accept
t.
(ii) At the time at which s′ proposes to c′, c′ has q(c′) temporary matches
and rejects s′. Student t is among those temporary matches. If s′ had
proposed to c′ before t, 1. would have applied. Therefore c′ would not
have rejected s′ if t had not proposed to it and everything else stayed the
same.
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Important Sets of Students. A student never proposes to the same college twice.
Therefore it holds for any student t ∈ µ(c) that c rejects in order to manipulate
DAA, that c is not matched with t under µ′. Let T = µ(c)\µ′(c) denote the set
of students that c is matched with under µ and rejects in order to manipulate
the outcome of DAA. Let S∗ = µ′(c) \ µ(c) denote the set of students that c is
matched with under µ′, but not under µ. According to definition of responsive
preferences, in order for µ′ to be a beneficial manipulation for c w.r.t. µ, it must
hold that for each t ∈ T there exists a distinct s ∈ S∗ s.t. s >c t. We therefore
obtain |T | = |S∗|. Under responsive preferences, a college c does not reject any
proposals from acceptable students s, i.e. s >c ∅, as long as its capacity q(c)
is not yet filled. Therefore if c rejects an acceptable student s, it must have
received q(c) proposals from students s′ s.t. s′ >c s, i.e. an acceptable student
may only be rejected in favor of another student. Note that this implies that
only colleges c with |µ(c)| = q(c) who receive more than q(c) proposals during
the truthful run of DAA can manipulate the outcome of student-proposing DAA
via misrepresenting their preferences, as formally stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let S,C be the agents of a many-to-one matching market in which
all colleges are required to submit complete preference lists and µ the matching
obtained by applying student-proposing DAA to this market. Given responsive
preferences over sets, only colleges c ∈ C s.t. |µ(c)| = q(c) who receive more
than q(c) proposals during the truthful run of DAA can manipulate the outcome
of student-proposing DAA via misrepresenting preferences.
Proof. Assume that c ∈ C can manipulate DAA via misrepresenting its pref-
erences while all other agents state their preferences truthfully. Then during
the manipulated execution of DAA, c must accept a student it does not accept
during the truthful run of DAA or reject a student it does not reject during the
truthful run of DAA.
Since all students are effectively acceptable to c, under responsive preferences
c must accept all proposals from students as long as its capacity is not yet filled.
Therefore if |µ(c)| < q(c) and/or c receives ≤ q(c) proposals during the truthful
run of DAA, c may not reject any of these proposals and there exist no students
that c receives a proposal from and does not accept. Since by assumption
c can manipulate the outcome of DAA, we obtain that |µ(c)| = q(c) and c
receives more than q(c) proposals during the execution of DAA under truthful
preferences.
In order to be able to reject a student t ∈ T , c must accept q(c) proposals
from students s 6= t. Since any new proposals only occur after c rejected some
t ∈ T , this implies that c must accept at least one proposal from a student u s.t.
u 6∈ µ(c) and u also proposes to c during the truthful run of DAA. Therefore
∀t ∈ T : u <c t according to the truthful preferences.
Let U denote the set of students u that c temporarily accepts in order to
reject students t ∈ T in favor of u. Since c can only reject a single student t ∈ T
in favor of each student u ∈ U , we obtain |U | = |T | and thereby also |U | = |S∗|.
Due to students u being less preferred than students t according to the truthful
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preferences, c may not be matched with any u ∈ U in a beneficial manipulation:
U ∩ µ′(c) = ∅. Therefore c must reject all students u ∈ U again upon accepting
proposals from students s ∈ S∗. Since |U | = |S∗| this means that whenever c
receives a new proposal from a student s ∈ S∗, a student u ∈ U is rejected in
its favor.
Chain of Rejections. Since c is matched with no student s ∈ S∗ under µ, but it
holds for all those students that there exists at least one student t ∈ µ(c) that
s is preferred to, no student s ∈ S∗ proposes to c during the truthful run of
DAA. Therefore all proposals from some s ∈ S∗ to c that are made during the
manipulated run of DAA are new proposals.
As stated above, since c is assumed to be the only manipulating college, all
new proposals must, directly or indirectly, be caused by c rejecting students
t ∈ T . Obviously the rejection of a student t ∈ T can not immediately cause
any new proposals to c. Upon being rejected by c, t will propose to colleges
c′ <t c in order of his or her preferences until t is either accepted by some such
c′ or proposed to all colleges.
If t is accepted by such a college c′, a student s′ might be rejected in favor of
t. According to definition of ‘rejecting in favor’, c′ does not reject s′ if t does not
propose to it while everything else stays the same. Since t does not propose to
c′ during the truthful run of DAA, we obtain that s′ is not rejected by c′ during
the truthful run. Therefore any proposals made by s′ after being rejected by c′
are new proposals.
Should it hold that s′ ∈ S∗ and s′ is not accepted by any c′′ s.t. c′ >s′ c′′ >s′
c, then the new proposal by s′ to c is caused by:
(i) c rejecting t, who then proposes to c′
(ii) c′ rejecting s′ in favor of t, who then proposes to c
We say that c rejecting t triggered a chain of rejections leading to s′ proposing
to c. Clearly such a chain of rejections could include more steps. Student s′
might instead be accepted by some college c′′ who rejects another student s′′ in
its favor and so on.
Illustrative Example. Before we proceed with our argument, consider the fol-
lowing example of a many-to-one matching market with sets
S ={s1, s2, s3, s4, t1, t2, t3, u1, u2, u3}
C ={c, c1, c2, c3, c4}
and the preference profile depicted in Figure 5, where “?” indicates that the
preferences over the agents that are not mentioned explicitly are irrelevant.
Given capacities q(c) = 3 and q(ci) = 1 for all i ∈ {1, ..., 4} student-proposing
DAA results in
µ =
(
s1 s2 s3 s4 t1 t2 t3 u1 u2 u3
c1 c2 c3 c4 c c c ∅ ∅ ∅
)
.
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s1 s2 s3 s4 t1 t2 t3 u1 u2 u3
c1 c2 c3 c4 c c c ? ? ?
c2 c3 c c c1 c2 c3 ? ? ?
? c ? ? ? c4 ? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? c c c
c c1 c2 c3 c4
s4 t1 s1 t3 t2
t3 s1 t2 s2 s4
s2 ? s2 s3 ?
t1 ? ? ? ?
s3 ? ? ? ?
t2 ? ? ? ?
s1 ? ? ? ?
u1 u1 u1 u1 u1
u2 u2 u2 u2 u2
u3 u3 u3 u3 u3
Figure 1: Example of a preference profile in a many-to-one matching market.
c
t1
t2
t3
c1 s1
c2 s2
t2
c3
c4 s4
s3
s2
c u2
u1
u3
Figure 2: Illustration of chains of rejections in the manipulation example. An edge from s ∈ S
to c ∈ C indicates s proposing to c, an edge from c ∈ C to s ∈ S indicates c rejecting s in
favor of an incoming proposal.
If c misrepresents its preferences as
s4 >c s2 >c s3 >c u1 >c u2 >c u3 >c s1 >c t3 >c t1 >c t2
student-proposing DAA instead gives
µ′ =
(
s1 s2 s3 s4 t1 t2 t3 u1 u2 u3
c2 c c c c1 c4 c3 ∅ ∅ ∅
)
.
All colleges strictly prefer µ′ to µ, while u1, u2 and u3 are indifferent between
the two matchings and all remaining students strictly prefer µ to µ′.
In this example we have T = {t1, t2, s3}, S
∗ = {s2, s3, s4}, and U =
{u1, u2, u3}.
All proposals by u1, u2, u3 as well as proposals from all remaining students to
their most preferred college occur during both the truthful and the manipulated
execution of DAA. Any additional proposals made during the manipulated run
of DAA are new proposals. Those new proposals are illustrated in Figure 5.
The graph contains three paths representing chains of rejections triggered by
the manipulating college c rejecting some t ∈ T and leading to some s ∈ S∗
proposing to c:
(i) c→ t1 → c1 → s1 → c2 → t2 → c4 → s4
(ii) c→ t2 → c2 → s2 → c3 → s3
(iii) c→ t3 → c3 → s2
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Beneficial Manipulation by Rejecting a Single Match. We show that each chain
of rejections triggered by the manipulating college c rejecting some t ∈ T leads
to a distinct s ∈ S∗ proposing to c. Moreover, it holds for all t ∈ T that there
exists a manipulation that is achieved via c misrepresenting its preferences while
all other agents state their preferences truthfully, s.t. T ′ = {t} and some s ∈ S∗
proposes to c during the manipulated run of DAA. Using those results, we then
show that whenever college-proposing DAA admits a beneficial manipulation
by a college c, then it also admits a beneficial manipulation by c s.t. |T ′| = 1.
Lemma 2. Let c ∈ C s.t. c can beneficially manipulate DAA. Then it holds for
each t ∈ T that the rejection of t by c triggers exactly one chain of rejections
leading to a distinct s ∈ S∗ proposing to c.
Proof. According to definition of in favor, a college rejects at most one student
in favor of another student proposing to it. The rejection of some t ∈ T by c
can therefore trigger at most one chain of rejections. Once such a chain leads
to some s ∈ S∗ proposing to c, some u ∈ U is rejected in favor of s. Since c
also rejected all students u ∈ U during the truthful run of DAA, the rejection
of u by c during the manipulated run of DAA will by itself not lead to any new
proposals to c.
After being rejected by c, u will propose to colleges less preferred than c, if
such colleges exist. Since all colleges c′ s.t. c >u c
′ >u µ(u) reject u during the
truthful run of DAA and all colleges but c state their preferences truthfully, u
will also be rejected by all those colleges c′ during the manipulated execution
of DAA. Therefore u will propose to µ(u).
If µ(u) = ∅ or µ(u) does not reject either u or another student v ∈ µ(µ(u)) in
favor of u, then no new proposals are triggered. Since µ(u) states its preferences
truthfully, new proposals can therefore only be triggered if µ(u) previously re-
ceived a new proposal itself, namely from a student s′ it prefers to at least one
of its matches under µ.
Such a new proposal can only have been caused by a chain of rejections
triggered by c rejecting some t ∈ T . Prior to being proposed to by u and
receiving any new proposals, µ(u) is either matched with < q(µ(u)) students
or the least preferred among its temporary matches is a student that µ(u) also
rejects during the truthful run of DAA. Therefore s′ proposing to µ(u) does not
immediately cause any new proposals.
In sum, c rejecting u can only lead to new proposals if a chain of rejections
triggered by c rejecting some t ∈ T lead to the new proposal by s′ to µ(u). Then
the new proposals caused by c rejecting u were initially triggered by c rejecting
t.
Therefore each chain of rejections triggered by c rejecting some t ∈ T can
lead to at most one s ∈ S∗ proposing to c. Since as stated above each t ∈ T
can trigger at most one such chain and |T | = |S∗|, we obtain that each t ∈ T
triggers exactly one chain of rejections leading to a distinct s ∈ S∗ proposing to
c.
Using this insight, we now show that it holds for each t ∈ T that if c mis-
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represents its preferences s.t. T ′ = {t}, some s ∈ S∗ proposes to c during the
such manipulated execution of DAA. Note that this does not yet imply that c
can beneficially manipulate DAA via such a misrepresentation, since it does not
necessarily hold that s >c t.
Lemma 3. Let c ∈ C s.t. c can beneficially manipulate DAA, t ∈ T and µ′′ be
a manipulation resulting from c misrepresenting its preferences s.t. T ′ = {t}.
Then some s ∈ S∗ proposes to c during the manipulated execution of DAA
yielding µ′′.
Proof. According to Lemma 2, the rejection of t by c triggers a chain of rejections
leading to a distinct s ∈ S∗ proposing to c. If that chain is not affected by any
other t′ ∈ T \ {t}, then clearly c can misrepresent its preferences such that
T ′ = {t}, leading to s proposing to c. Unaffected means that the students that
are rejected along that chain are 6∈ T and did not propose to the college they are
rejected from as part of a chain leading from some t′ ∈ T \ {t} to some s ∈ S∗
proposing to c.
We consider the two ways in which the chain of rejections triggered by c
rejecting t can be affected by some t′ ∈ T \ {t} separately.
1. A student rejected along that chain is some t′ ∈ T . 2
Let c′ be the college that rejects t′ and s′ be the student in whose favor
c′ rejects t′. Then c′ was at some point proposed to by t′ and rejected
a student s′′ in its favor. Since s′ >c′ t
′ and t′ >c′ s
′′ we obtain by
transitivity of preferences that s′ >c′ s
′′.
Therefore if t′ does not propose to c′, but s′ does, c′ will reject s′′ in its
favor. Since c′ rejecting s′′ in favor of t′ was part of the path from t′ to
some s ∈ S∗, the new path containing c′ rejecting s′′ for s′ will also end
in this same s ∈ S∗.
2. A student s′ that is rejected by some c′ along the chain only proposed to c′
due to a chain of rejections triggered by some c rejecting some t′ ∈ T \{t}.
Let s′′ be the student that c′ rejected in favor of s′ and s′′′ be the student
in whose favor c′ rejected s′. Then the chain of rejections that is triggered
by c rejecting t′ and includes s′ proposing to c′ which rejects s′′ in its favor
leads to some s ∈ S∗ proposing to c. Since s′′′ >c′ s′ and s′ >c′ s′′ we
obtain by transitivity of preferences that s′′′ >c′ s
′′.
Therefore if s′ does not propose to c′, but s′′′ does, c′ will reject s′′ in its
favor. Since c′ rejecting s′′ in favor of s′ was part of the path from t′ to
some s ∈ S∗, the new path containing c′ rejecting s′′ for s′′′ will also end
in this same s ∈ S∗.
Therefore it holds for each t ∈ T that c can misrepresent its preferences s.t.
T ′ = {t} and some s ∈ S∗ proposes to c during the manipulated execution of
DAA, though not necessarily s.t. s >c t.
Using Lemma 3, we prove the following.
2The first chain of rejections in the example is an instance of this case.
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Theorem 1. If a given college c can beneficially manipulate student-proposing
DAA via misrepresenting preferences, then there also exists a beneficial manip-
ulation by c s.t. |T ′| = 1.
Proof. Let tk be the least preferred student among T , i.e. ∀t′ ∈ T \{tk} : t′ >c tk.
Then according to Lemma 3 there exist a misrepresentation of preferences by c
and a student s ∈ S∗ s.t. T ′ = {tk} and s proposes to c during the manipulated
execution of DAA yielding µ′′. Since all students s ∈ S∗ are strictly preferred
to tk,c will accept this proposal and thereby µ
′′(c) = {s} ∪ µ(c) \ {tk}. The
manipulation µ′′ is therefore beneficial for c w.r.t. µ.
Reduction to One-to-One. Using Theorem 1, we show that the problem of decid-
ing whether a given college c ∈ C can beneficially manipulate student-proposing
DAA via misrepresenting its preferences when all other agents state their pref-
erences truthfully can be reduced to that of finding a beneficial manipulation
via misrepresentation for a given proposee in a one-to-one matching market.
We first show that the execution of student-proposing DAA for a many-to-one
matching market can be simulated via executing DAA for an associated one-to-
one market as suggested in [19, p. 133ff]:
Lemma 4. Let C, S be the agents of a many-to-one matching market, P their
preference profile and µm2o denote the matching that results from applying
student-proposing DAA to the market. Then there exists a one-to-one match-
ing market with sets of agents C′, S and preference profile P′ and a mapping
function f : C → C′ s.t. ∀c ∈ C : µm2o(c) =
⋃
ci∈f(c)
µo2o(ci) where µo2o
denotes the matching that results from applying DAA to the one-to-one market,
and ∀s ∈ S : f(µm2o(s)) ∋ µo2o.
By combining Theorem 1 and Lemma 4, we reduce the problem of deciding
whether a given college c can beneficially manipulate DAA to that of deciding
whether at least one agent ci ∈ f(c) can beneficially manipulate DAA in the
related one-to-one market. This is formally stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Let C, S be the agents of a many-to-one matching market, P
their preference profile and c ∈ C. Then c can beneficially manipulate student-
proposing DAA via misrepresenting its preferences if and only if in the associated
one-to-one market with sets of agents C′, S, preference profile P′ and mapping
function f there exists at least one ci ∈ f(c) s.t. ci can beneficially manipulate
DAA via misrepresenting its preferences.
The problem of finding a beneficial manipulation via misrepresentation for a
given proposee in one-to-one matchings was shown to be solvable in polynomial
time in [22]. We therefore obtain our final result.
Theorem 3. The problem of deciding whether a given college c ∈ C can ben-
eficially manipulate student-proposing DAA via misrepresenting its preferences
is solvable in polynomial time.
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Proof. By Theorem 2, we can decide the problem by checking whether in the
associated one-to-one market at least one ci ∈ f(c) can beneficially manipulate
DAA via misrepresenting its preferences. Since |f(c)| = q(c) and a possible
beneficial manipulation for a given proposee in a one-to-one market, can be
found in polynomial time, the statement follows.
Regarding the problem of finding an optimal manipulation for a college under
college-proposing DAA, we immediately get a polynomial algorithm by itera-
tively applying the steps from the proof of Theorem 3. As long as there still
is a beneficial manipulation, we find it in polynomial time and the number of
possible improvements for a single college is polynomial in the input size.
Corollary 1. A college’s optimal manipulation by misrepresenting preferences
under student-proposing DAA can be found in polynomial time.
Note, however, that there may be many optimal strategies as many match-
ings are incomparable under responsive preferences.
6. Manipulation of college-proposing DAA
We show that the problem of deciding whether a given college c ∈ C can
beneficially manipulate college-proposing DAA via misrepresenting its prefer-
ences when all other agents state their preferences truthfully is fixed-parameter
tractable. The worst case complexity of finding a beneficial manipulation for
c, if one exists, depends only on its capacity q(c), not on the size of the mar-
ket. Let S,C be the agents of a many-to-one matching market and µ denote
the matching that is obtained by applying DAA to this market. In general, a
college c ∈ C can manipulate the outcome of DAA by accepting a student it
does not accept during an execution of DAA under truthful preferences or by
rejecting a student it is matched with under µ. Under college-proposing DAA,
this can be achieved by making new proposals or by not proposing to a student
the college is matched with under µ. Making new proposals can never lead to a
beneficial manipulation, as formally stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 5. Let S,C be the agents of a many-to-one matching market and µ
the matching that is obtained by applying DAA to the market. Given responsive
preferences over sets, no college can benefit from a manipulation in which it
proposes to a student it does not propose to during an execution of college-
proposing DAA under the truthful preferences.
A beneficial manipulation can therefore only be achieved by falsifying pref-
erences s.t. c does not propose to at least one student s ∈ µ(c) during the
manipulated execution of DAA. When considering manipulation via misrepre-
senting preferences, this implies that only colleges that fill their capacity under
µ can beneficially manipulate DAA. Using Lemma 5, we can prove the following
lemma.
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Lemma 6. Let S,C be the agents of a many-to-one matching market in which
all agents are required to submit complete preference lists, µ the matching re-
sulting from applying DAA to the market and c ∈ C s.t. c can beneficially
manipulate DAA via misrepresenting its preferences. Then |µ(c)| = q(c).
Proof. According to Lemma 5, a college can only beneficially manipulate college-
proposing DAA by not proposing to student(s) it is matched with under µ. Since
all students s ∈ S are acceptable to all colleges c ∈ C, a college proposes to
students in order of its preferences until either its capacity is filled or it proposed
to all students. Therefore any college that does not fill its capacitymust propose
to all students.
For colleges c with |µ(c)| < q(c) the question of whether this college can
beneficially manipulate DAA can therefore trivially be answered without any
further computations. The same applies to all colleges c with capacity q(c) = 1,
as implied by the following lemma. In sum, only colleges c with |µ(c)| = q(c) > 1
can potentially benefit from manipulating college-proposing DAA. A beneficial
manipulation is achieved by misrepresenting preferences s.t. c does not propose
to a set of students R ⊆ µ(c) where |R| ≥ 1. It is easy to see that if it is
at all possible for c to misrepresent its preferences s.t. it does not propose
to any student r ∈ R, then this can also be achieved by c misrepresenting
its preferences s.t. all students s ∈ S \ R are listed according to the truthful
preferences, followed by all students r ∈ R in arbitrary order.
We now use these insights to show that the problem of deciding whether
a given college c ∈ C can beneficially manipulate college-proposing DAA via
misrepresenting its preferences when all other agents state their preferences
truthfully can be solved via at most 2q(c)−1−1 executions of DAA and is thereby
fixed-parameter tractable w.r.t. the parameter q(c).
Theorem 4. Let S,C be the agents of a many-to-one matching market. At
most 2q(c)−1−1 executions of DAA are necessary in order to determine whether
a given college c ∈ C can beneficially manipulate the outcome of DAA via mis-
representing preferences.
Proof. Let S,C be the agents of a many-to-one matching market and µ the
matching that is obtained by applying DAA to this market. According to
Lemma 5, a college can only beneficially manipulate DAA by not proposing
to student(s) it is matched with under µ. Further, by Lemma 6, only colleges
c ∈ C with |µ(c)| = q(c) > 1 are able to achieve a beneficial manipulation.
Let c ∈ C s.t. |µ(c)| = q(c) > 1, sl be the least preferred, according to >c,
student among µ(c) and R ⊆ µ(c) s.t. sl ∈ R. Assume that c can beneficially
manipulate DAA by misrepresenting its preferences s.t. all students s ∈ S \ R
are listed according to the truthful preferences, followed by all students r ∈ R
in arbitrary order. According to Lemma 5, c does not propose to any student
u s.t. sl >c u during the manipulated execution of DAA. Therefore the same
beneficial manipulation can be achieved by c misrepresenting its preferences s.t.
all students s ∈ {sl} ∪ S \ R are listed according to the truthful preferences,
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followed by all students r ∈ R\{sl} in arbitrary order. A beneficial manipulation
for c, if one exists, can therefore be found by picking non-empty subsets R ⊆
µ(c)\ {sl} and computing the outcome of DAA if c states its preferences s.t. all
students s ∈ S \ R are listed according to the truthful preferences, followed by
students r ∈ R in arbitrary order. Since |µ(c) \ {sl}| = q(c)− 1, DAA must be
executed for at most 2q(c)−1 − 1 sets R.
Since every possible manipulation of a college c under college-proposing DAA
corresponds to a non-empty subset R ⊂ µ(c), we can find an optimal manipula-
tion by checking every possible subset. Just as in the proof of Theorem 4, this
implies a bound of 2q(c)−1 − 1 on the number of DAA executions.
Corollary 2. Finding a college’s c optimal manipulation by misrepresenting
preferences under student-proposing DAA is fixed-parameter tractable w.r.t. the
parameter q(c).
7. Experimental Results
We performed a series of simulations on randomly generated markets to esti-
mate the fraction of instances of matching markets that can be beneficially ma-
nipulated by a single college if all other agents state their preferences truthfully.
DAA was first executed under the truthful preferences once, in order to obtain
the resulting matching µ. For each college c ∈ C s.t. |µ(c)| = q(c) > 1 we then
computed all non-empty subsets R ⊆ µ(c) \ {sl}, where sl is the least preferred,
according to >c, student among µ(c). Subsequently, DAA was executed with c
misrepresenting its preferences s.t. all students s ∈ S \ R are listed according
to the truthful preferences, followed by all students r ∈ R for different sets R,
until either a beneficial manipulation by c was found or all sets R were checked
in this manner. In our simulations, the fraction of manipulable instances of
matching markets lay between 5.7% and 81.2% for student-proposing (36.53%
on average) and between 13.6% and 100% for college-proposing DAA (69.93%
on average). These experimental results suggest that the fraction of matching
markets that can be beneficially manipulated is significant, independently of
whether the student-proposing or the college-proposing version of DAA is used.
Preferences of both students and colleges were generated using the PrefLib
tool by Mattei and Walsh. The tool enables the generation of preference data
using different methods, among which we chose those of impartial cultures (IC)
and Mallows mixtures (MM) [13]. Under IC, each (complete) preference list has
the same probability, i.e. preferences are generated uniformly at random. This
is a standard method for generating random preference profiles for simulations,
which was for example also used by Teo et al. [22] as well as by Roth and
Peranson [18]. Preference profile generation using MM is parametrized by a set
of reference rankings R and a noise parameter φ ∈ [0, 1].
We consider markets with 100 to 200 students and 15 to 30 colleges. These
numbers were chosen to allow us to compare the degree of manipulability of
markets with different ratios of |S| to |C|, while keeping the computational effort
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involved within reasonable limits. For each of these markets, we generated 1000
sets of preference profiles each using IC as well as MM with a number of different
parameter values. The capacities of colleges were generated using the following
two methods.
(i) Capacities were generated uniformly at random between 1 and
⌈
|S|
|C|
⌉
.
(ii) Capacities were initialized using method 1. While
∑
c∈C q(c) < |S|, a
college was selected uniformly at random and its capacity increased by 1.
We applied both methods to each generated preference profile. This allows us to
compare the manipulability of markets in which it is likely that some students
remain unmatched (method 1) to those in which each student is guaranteed
to be admitted to some college (method 2). To allow for a better comparison
of the degree of manipulability by colleges in student-proposing and college-
proposing DAA, the same preference profiles were used to simulate DAA in
both kinds of markets. In all simulations, the percentage of instances that
can be beneficially manipulated is considerably higher under college-proposing
DAA than under student-proposing DAA. On average 33.42%, at least 7% and
up to 70.7% more instances are manipulable under college-proposing DAA than
under student-proposing DAA. Instances that are manipulable by at least one
college, however, can on average be beneficially manipulated by less colleges
under college-proposing DAA (9.07% on average) than under student-proposing
DAA (16.61% on average).
8. Summary and Future Work
In this paper, we examine two issues regarding colleges manipulating DAA:
frequency of manipulable instances and the complexity of manipulation. We
investigated both issues w.r.t. manipulation by colleges in many-to-one mar-
kets, in which participants are required to submit complete preference lists.
We summarize our contributions in the context of previously existing results
in Table 1. Based on our experimental results on markets, we concluded that
DAA variant proposer proposee
one-to-one strategyproof in P (Teo et al. [22])
many-to-one
strategyproof in P (Thm. 3)
(student-
proposing)
many-to-one
FPT (Thm. 4) in P (from one-to-one)
(college-
proposing)
many-to-many FPT (from Thm. 4) in P (from Thm. 3)
Table 1: Computational complexity of manipulating DAA by misrepresenting preferences in
markets with complete preference lists, strict and responsive preferences and fixed capacities.
The results in bold are from this paper.
17
a significant fraction of instances of matching markets can be beneficially ma-
nipulated by at least one college, independently of whether student-proposing
or college-proposing DAA is used. Our results indicate that college-proposing
DAA is significantly more likely to be beneficially manipulable. However, the
average percentage of colleges that could benefit from a manipulation, given
that the market is manipulable by at least one college, was considerably lower
under college-proposing DAA. Another interesting result concerns the capacities
of colleges. In all our simulations, markets in which the capacities of colleges
were chosen such that every student is guaranteed to be admitted to some col-
lege were considerably more prone to manipulation than those in which some
students remained unmatched. A natural extension of our work is to investi-
gate whether these results transfer to matching markets in which agents are
allowed to submit preference lists of arbitrary length. So far, no complexity
results regarding manipulation by colleges in these kinds of markets exist.
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